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July/August 2006 cover 120

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Are We a Nation "Under God"?
By Samuel P. Huntington

As this issue of The American Enterprise goes to press in June, the U.S. Supreme Court is considering whether the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance are a violation of the separation of church and state. In 2002, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco decided by a two-to-one vote that the phrase represented an un-Constitutional "endorsement of religion" and "a profession of religious belief...in monotheism."

 

President Bush termed this decision "ridiculous." Senate minority leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) called it "nuts"; Governor George Pataki of New York said it was "junk justice." The Senate passed a resolution, 99 to zero, urging that the decision be reversed, and members of the House of Representatives gathered on the steps of the Capitol to recite the Pledge and sing "God Bless America." A Newsweek poll found that 87 percent of the public supported inclusion of the words, while 9 percent were opposed. Eighty-four percent also said they approved of references to God in public settings, including schools and government buildings, so long as no "specific religion" was mentioned.

 

This battle over the Pledge has stimulated vigorous controversy on an issue central to America's identity. Opponents of "under God" (which was added to the pledge in 1954) argue that the United States is a secular country, that the First Amendment prohibits rhetorical or material state support for religion, and that people should be able to pledge allegiance to their country without implicitly also affirming a belief in God. Supporters point out that the phrase is perfectly consonant with the views of the framers of the Constitution, that Lincoln had used these words in the Gettysburg Address, and that the Supreme Court has long held that no one could be compelled to say the Pledge.

 

The man who brought this court challenge, Michael Newdow, aims "to ferret out all insidious uses of religion in daily life," according to the New York Times. "Why should I be made to feel like an outsider?" he asked. The Court of Appeals in San Francisco agreed that the words "under God" sent "a message to unbelievers that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community."

 

Newdow and the court majority got it right: Atheists are "outsiders" in the American community. Americans are one of the most religious people in the world, particularly compared to the peoples of other highly industrialized democracies. But they nonetheless tolerate and respect the rights of atheists and nonbelievers. Unbelievers do not have to recite the Pledge, or engage in any religiously tainted practice of which they disapprove. They also, however, do not have the right to impose their atheism on all those Americans whose beliefs now and historically have defined America as a religious nation.

 

Statistics say America is not only a religious nation but also a Christian one. Up to 85 percent of Americans identify themselves as Christians. Brian Cronin, who litigated against a cross on public land in Boise, Idaho, complained, "For Buddhists, Jews, Muslims, and other non-Christians in Boise, the cross only drives home the point that they are strangers in a strange land." Like Newdow and the Ninth Circuit judges, Cronin was on target. America is a predominantly Christian nation with a secular government. Non-Christians may legitimately see themselves as strangers because they or their ancestors moved to this "strange land" founded and peopled by Christians--even as Christians become strangers by moving to Israel, India, Thailand, or Morocco.

 

Americans have been extremely religious and over-whelmingly Christian throughout their history. The seventeenth-century settlers founded their communities in America in large part for religious reasons. Eighteenth- century Americans and their leaders saw their Revolution in religious and largely biblical terms. The Revolution reflected their "covenant with God" and was a war between "God's elect" and the British "Antichrist." Jefferson, Paine, and other Deists and nonbelievers felt it necessary to invoke religion to justify the Revolution. The Continental Congress declared days of fasting to implore the forgiveness and help of God, and days of thanksgiving for what He had done to promote their cause. Well into the nineteenth century, Sunday church services were held in the chambers of the Supreme Court and the House of Representatives. The Declaration of Independence appealed to "Nature's God," the "Creator," "the Supreme Judge of the World," and "divine Providence" for approval, legitimacy, and protection.

 

The Constitution includes no such references. Yet its framers firmly believed that the republican government they were creating could only last if it was deeply rooted in morality and religion. "A Republic can only be supported by pure religion or austere morals," John Adams said. The Bible offers "the only system that ever did or ever will preserve a republic in the world." Washington agreed: "Reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principles." The happiness of the people, good order, and civil government, declared the Massachusetts constitution of 1780, "essentially depend on piety, religion, and morality." Fifty years after the Constitution was adopted, Tocqueville reported that all Americans held religion "to be indispensable to the maintenance of republican institutions."

 

The words "separation of church and state" do not appear in the Constitution, and, as the historian Sidney Mead has pointed out, Madison spoke not of "church" and "state," European concepts with little relevance to America, but of "sects" and "Civil authority," and the "line" not the "wall" between them. Religion and society were coterminous.

 

Some people cite the absence of religious language in the Constitution and the provisions of the First Amendment as evidence that America is fundamentally a secular country. Nothing could be further from the truth. At the end of the eighteenth century, religious establishments existed throughout Europe and in several American states. Control of the church was a key element of state power, and the established church, in turn, provided legitimacy to the state. The framers of the American Constitution prohibited an established national church in order to limit the power of government and to protect and strengthen religion. The purpose of "separation of church and state," as William McLoughlin has said, was not to establish freedom from religion but to establish freedom for religion. It was spectacularly successful. In the absence of a state religion, Americans were not only free to believe as they wished but also free to create whatever religious communities and organizations they desired. As a result, Americans have been unique among peoples in the diversity of sects, denominations, and religious movements to which they have given birth, almost all embodying some form of Protestantism. When substantial numbers of Catholic immigrants arrived, it was eventually possible to accept Catholicism as one more denomination within the broad framework of Christianity. The proportion of the population who were "religious adherents," that is church members, increased fairly steadily through most of American history.

 

European observers repeatedly commented on the high levels of religious commitment of Americans compared to that of their own peoples. As usual, Tocqueville said it most eloquently: "On my arrival in the United States the religious aspect of the country was the first thing that struck my attention, and the longer I stayed there, the more I perceived the great political consequences resulting from this new state of things." In France religion and liberty opposed each other. The Americans, in contrast, "have succeeded [in] combining admirably...the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty." Religion in America "must be regarded as the first of their political institutions."

 

A half century after Tocqueville, English historian and statesman James Bryce came to a similar conclusion. The Americans are "a religious people"; religion "influences conduct...probably more than it does in any other modern country, and far more than it did in the so-called ages of faith." And again, "the influence of Christianity seems to be…greater and more widespread in the United States than in any part of western Continental Europe, and I think greater than in England." A half century after Bryce, the eminent Swedish observer Gunnar Myrdal judged that "America probably is still the most religious country in the Western world." And a half century after him, the English historian Paul Johnson described America as "a God-fearing country, with all it implies." America's religious commitment "is a primary source—the primary source, I think—of American exceptionalism."

 

Today, overwhelming majorities of Americans affirm religious beliefs. When asked in 1999 whether they believed in God, or a universal spirit, or neither, 86 percent of those polled said they believed in God, 8 percent in a universal spirit, and 5 percent in neither. When asked in 2003 simply whether they believed in God or not, 92 percent said yes. In a series of 2002–03 polls, 57 to 65 percent of Americans said religion was very important in their lives, 23 to 27 percent said fairly important, and 12 to 18 percent said not very important. In 1996, 39 percent of Americans said they believed the Bible is the actual word of God and should be taken literally; 46 percent said they believed the Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally word for word; 13 percent said it is not the word of God.

 

Large proportions of Americans also appear to be active in the practice of their religion. In 2002 and 2003, an average of 65 percent of Americans claimed membership in a church or synagogue. About 40 percent said they had attended church or synagogue in the last seven days. Roughly 33 percent said they went to church at least once a week, 10 percent almost every week, 15 percent about once a month, 27 percent seldom or a few times a year, and 15 percent never. In the same time period, about 60 percent of Americans said they prayed one or more times a day, more than 20 percent once or more a week, about 10 percent less than once a week, and 10 percent never. Given human nature, these claims of religious practice may be overstated, but even accounting for this factor, the level of religious activity was still high; and the extent to which Americans believe the right response is to affirm their religiosity is itself evidence for the centrality of religious norms in American society.

 

Reflecting on the depth of American religiosity, the Swedish theologian Krister Stendhal remarked, "Even the atheists in America speak in a religious key." Only about 10 percent of Americans, however, espouse atheism, and most Americans do not approve of it. A 1973 poll asked: "Should a socialist or an atheist be allowed to teach in a college or university?" The community leaders surveyed approved of both teaching. The American public as a whole agreed that socialists could teach (52 percent yes, 39 percent no), but decisively rejected the idea of atheists on college or university faculties (38 percent yes, 57 percent no). Since the 1930s, the willingness of Americans to vote for a Presidential candidate from a minority group has increased dramatically, with over 90 percent of those polled in 1999 saying they would vote for a black, Jewish, or female Presidential candidate, while 59 percent were willing to vote for a homosexual. Only 49 percent, however, were willing to vote for an atheist. Americans seem to agree with the Founding Fathers that their republican government requires a religious base, and hence they find it difficult to accept the explicit rejection of God and religion.

 

These high levels of religiosity would be less significant if they were the norm for other countries. Americans differ dramatically, however, in their religiosity from the people of other economically developed countries. This religiosity is conclusively revealed in three cross-national surveys. First, in general, the level of religious commitment of countries varies inversely with their level of economic development: People in poor countries are highly religious, those in rich countries are not. America is the glaring exception. If America were like most other countries at her level of economic development, only 5 percent of Americans would think religion very important.

 

Second, an International Social Survey Program questionnaire in 1991 asked people in 17 countries seven questions concerning their belief in God, life after death, heaven, and other religious concepts. Reporting the results, George Bishop ranked the countries according to the percentage of their population that affirmed these religious beliefs. The United States was far ahead in its overall level of religiosity, ranking first on four questions, second on one, and third on two, for an average ranking of 1.7. It was followed by Northern Ireland (2.4), where religion is obviously of crucial importance to both Protestants and Catholics, and then by four Catholic countries. After them came New Zealand, Israel, five Western European countries, and four former communist countries, with East Germany last, the least religious on six of the seven questions. According to this poll, Americans are more deeply religious than even the people of countries like Ireland and Poland, where religion has been the core of national identity differentiating them from their traditional British, German, and Russian antagonists.

 

Third, the 1990–93 World Values Survey asked nine questions concerning religiosity in 41 countries. Overall these data show the United States to be one of the most religious countries in the world. Most striking is the high religiosity of America in comparison to other Protestant countries. The top 15 religious countries include Nigeria, India, and Turkey (the only African and predominantly Hindu and Muslim countries in the sample), eight predominantly Catholic countries, one Orthodox country (Romania), sharply divided Northern Ireland, and two predominantly Protestant countries, the United States in fifth place and Canada in fifteenth place. Except for Iceland, all the other predominantly Protestant countries fall well into the lower half of those surveyed. America is thus by a large margin the most religious Protestant country.

 

Along with their general religiosity, the Christianity of Americans has also impressed foreign observers. "There is no country in the world," Tocqueville said, "where the Christian religion retains a greater influence over the souls of men than in America." Christianity, Bryce similarly observed, is "the national religion" of Americans. Americans have also affirmed their Christian identity. "We are a Christian people," the Supreme Court declared in 1811. The Senate Judiciary Committee echoed these words exactly in 1853, adding that "almost our entire population belong to or sympathize with some one of the Christian denominations." In the midst of the Civil War, Lincoln also described Americans as "a Christian people." In 1892 the Supreme Court again declared, "This is a Christian nation." In 1908, a House of Representatives committee said that "the best and only reliance for the perpetuation of the republican institution is upon a Christian patriotism." In 1917 Congress passed legislation declaring a day of prayer in support of the war effort and invoking America's status as a Christian nation. In 1931 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier view: "We are a Christian people, according to one another the equal right of religious freedom, and acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the will of God."

 

While the balance between Protestants and Catholics shifted over the years, the proportion of Americans identifying themselves as Christian has remained relatively constant. In three surveys between 1989 and 1996, between 84 and 88 percent of Americans said they were Christians. The proportion of Christians in America rivals or exceeds the proportion of Jews in Israel, of Muslims in Egypt, of Hindus in India, and of Orthodox believers in Russia.

 

America's Christian identity has, nonetheless, been questioned on two grounds. First, it is argued that America is losing that identity because non-Christian religions are expanding in numbers, and Americans are thus becoming a multireligious and not simply a multidenominational people. Second, it is argued that Americans are losing their religious identity and are becoming secular, atheistic, materialistic, and indifferent to their religious heritage. Neither of these propositions comes close to the truth.

 

The argument that America is losing its Christian identity due to the spread of non-Christian religions was advanced by several scholars in the 1980s and 1990s. They pointed to the growing numbers of Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, and Buddhists in American society. Hindus in America increased from 70,000 in 1977 to 800,000 in 1997. Muslims amounted to at least 3.5 million in 1997, while Buddhists numbered somewhere between 750,000 and 2 million. From these developments, the proponents of de-Christianization argue, in the words of Professor Diana Eck, that "religious diversity" has "shattered the paradigm of America" as an overwhelmingly Christian country with a small Jewish minority. Another scholar suggested that public holidays should be adjusted to accommodate this increasing religious diversity and that, for a start, it would be desirable to "have one Christian holiday (say, Christmas), but replace Easter and Thanksgiving with a Muslim and Jewish holiday." In some measure, however, the holiday trend was in the opposite direction. Hanukkah, "traditionally a minor Jewish holiday," has, according to Professor Jeff Spinner, been elevated into the "Jewish Christmas" and displaced Purim as a holiday, so as "to fit in better with the dominant culture."

 

The increases in the membership of some non-Christian religions have not, to put it mildly, had any significant effect on America's Christian identity. As a result of assimilation, low birth rates, and intermarriage, the proportion of Jews dropped from 4 percent in the 1920s to 3 percent in the 1950s to slightly over 2 percent in 1997. If the absolute numbers claimed by their spokesmen are correct, by 1997 about 1.5 percent of Americans were Muslim, while Hindus and Buddhists were each less than one percent. The numbers of non-Christian, non-Jewish believers undoubtedly will continue to grow, but for years to come they will remain extremely small. Some increases in the membership of non-Christian religions come from conversions, but the largest share is from immigration and high birth rates. The immigrants of these religions, however, are far outnumbered by the huge numbers of immigrants from Latin America and the Philippines, almost all of whom are Catholic and also have high birth rates. Latin American immigrants are also converting to evangelical Protestantism. In addition, Christians in Asia and the Middle East have been more likely than non-Christians to migrate to America. As of 1990, a majority of Asian Americans were Christian rather than Buddhist or Hindu. Among Korean Americans, Christians outnumber Buddhists by at least ten to one. Roughly one third of Vietnamese immigrants are Catholics. About two thirds of Arab Americans have been Christian rather than Muslim, although the number of Muslims was growing rapidly before September 11. While a precise judgment is impossible, at the start of the twenty-first century the United States was probably becoming more rather than less Christian in its religious composition.

 

Americans tend to have a certain catholicity toward religion: All deserve respect. Given this general tolerance of religious diversity, non-Christian faiths have little alternative but to recognize and accept America as a Christian society. "Americans have always thought of themselves as a Christian nation," argues Jewish neoconservative Irving Kristol, "equally tolerant of all religions so long as they were congruent with traditional Judeo-Christian morality. But equal toleration...never meant perfect equality of status in fact." Christianity is not legally established, "but it is established informally, nevertheless." And, Kristol warns his fellow Jews, that is a fact they must accept.

 

But if increases in non-Christian membership haven't diluted Christianity in America, hasn't it been diluted, dissolved, and supplanted over time by a culture that is pervasively secular and irreligious, if not anti-religious? These terms describe segments of American intellectual, academic, and media elites, but not the bulk of the American people. American religiosity could still be high by absolute measures and high relative to that of comparable societies, yet the secularization thesis would still be valid if the commitment of Americans to religion declined over time. Little or no evidence exists of such a decline. The one significant shift that does appear to have occurred is a drop in the 1960s and 1970s in the religious commitment of Catholics. An overall fall-off in church attendance in the 1960s was due to a decline in the proportion of Catholics attending mass every Sunday. In 1952, 83 percent of Catholics said that religion was very important in their lives; in 1987, 54 percent of Catholics said this. This shift brought Catholic attitudes on religion more into congruence with those of Protestants.

 

Over the course of American history, fluctuations did occur in levels of American religious commitment and religious involvement. There has not, however, been an overall downward trend in American religiosity. At the start of the twenty-first century, Americans are no less committed, and are quite possibly more committed, to their Christian identity than at any time in their history.

 

Samuel Huntington is Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor at Harvard, and a member of AEI's Council of Academic Advisers. This is adapted from his latest book Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity.




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